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Abstract
We investigate whether interventions by (i) medical doctors and (ii) occupational
specialists are effective in reducing sick leave durations among self-employed work-
ers. Therefore, we exploit unique administrative data comprising all sick leave
claims by self-employed workers insured with a major Dutch private insurer be-
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tween January 2009 and March 2014. We estimate a multivariate duration model
dealing with non-random selection into the two intervention types by controlling
for observable and unobservable claimant characteristics. We find adverse treat-
ment effects for both interventions, irrespective of whether they are started early or
(middle) late in the sickness spell.
2
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, many studies have provided (or reviewed) evidence for the presence of
moral hazard in public sickness insurance systems (Fevang et al., 2014; Kreider et al., 2015;
Pichler, 2015; Peter et al., 2016; Puig-Junoy, 2016). For example, Barmby et al. (1991), Hen-
rekson and Persson (2004), Johansson and Palme (2005), Ziebarth (2010), Markussen et al.
(2011), Ziebarth (2013), Bo¨ckerman et al. (2014), De Paola et al. (2014), Ziebarth (2014) and
Pichler and Ziebarth (2016) indicate that more generous sick leave benefits increase the inci-
dence and/or the duration of sickness absenteeism. In addition, some studies have investigated
the effectiveness of medical practitioners in reducing this sick leave. On the one hand, Carlsen
and Nyborg (2009) find, based on focus group interviews in Norway, that general practitioners
fail as gatekeepers. They relate this empirical finding to the fact that (i) general practitioners
are unable to distinguish shirkers from truly sick, and that (ii) patients, truly sick or not, prefer
– and, therefore, engage – physicians who give priority to healing over gatekeeping. Moreover,
Engstro¨m et al. (2017) show that early assessment of the need for vocational rehabilitation in
the Swedish sickness insurance system does not bring individuals on sick leave closer to the
labour market. On the other hand, Markussen (2010) shows that the introduction of stricter
regulations for physicians’ sick leave certification in Norway results both in lower sick leave
entry rates and in lower recovery rates. In the same direction, Hartman et al. (2013) find that
medical certification is an important instrument for managing sickness absenteeism in Sweden.
This evidence with respect to both moral hazard in public sickness insurance and the effec-
tiveness of medical practitioners to reduce this moral hazard may, however, not be generalised
to self-employed workers. In many OECD countries, self-employed workers are not covered by
the public sickness insurance system so that they have to buy insurance on the private market.
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The fact that self-employed workers decide themselves on the level of private sickness insur-
ance may lead to different insurance, intervention and recovery dynamics. Furthermore, there
are several reasons why self-employed workers have more interest in reducing their absence
durations, even beyond what is optimal from a health point of view. First, financial incentives
to avoid sickness absenteeism are often larger for self-employed workers. A long period of
absence may lead to lost investments and irrecoverable loss of market share because finding
an adequate substitute can be difficult (Hyytinen and Ruuskanen, 2007). Second, although
they experience, on average, more stress than employees, self-employed workers are found
to be more satisfied and involved with their jobs (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Parasura-
man and Simmers, 2001; Parker, 2004; Hyytinen and Ruuskanen, 2007). Finally, following
Parker (2004) and Lechmann and Schnabel (2014) self-employed workers are characterised
by a higher need for achievement, love of independence, risk taking propensity and optimism
level. These personal characteristics seem in favour of short absence durations.
In this study, we are the first to investigate whether medical interventions are effective in
reducing sick leave durations among self-employed workers. Therefore, we exploit unique
administrative data from a major Dutch private insurance company. Our analysis is based on
all (i.e. more than 15,000) sickness benefit applications of self-employed workers suffering
from a physical condition between January 2009 and March 2014. As the insurance company
uses both “medical track” and “labour track” interventions, we are able to compare the relative
effectiveness of medical doctors (offering medical support) versus occupational specialists (of-
fering ergonomic advice and coaching) in reducing sick leave durations. In the data, claims and
interventions are recorded with a daily precision. Moreover, the company’s database provides
detailed claimant information.
In the spirit of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), we exploit the time variation in the start
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of the intervention tracks to capture causal effects on the timing of recovery. More precisely,
we develop a multivariate duration model that deals with the non-random and dynamic selec-
tion into the tracks by controlling for observable and unobservable intervention determinants.
This model allows to identify heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the moment of
intervention and claim(ant) characteristics.
From a policy perspective, an answer to our research question is crucial to insurers who are
responsible for paying sickness benefits and decide about engaging doctors and occupational
specialists in order to minimise these payments. Furthermore, self-employed workers may
financially suffer from sickness absenteeism so they might be interested in the effectiveness
of medical intervention, ergonomic advice and coaching themselves. Lastly, the results of this
study are relevant to public policymakers who are interested in a stronger role for doctors and
occupational specialists as gatekeepers of the welfare state.1
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background con-
cerning the private sickness insurance system in the Netherlands and the medical interventions.
In Section 3 we present our data and provide a descriptive analysis. Section 4 introduces the
econometric model and Section 5 contains our estimation results. The final section concludes.
1Recent reforms in the Dutch sickness and disability insurance system focussed on empow-
ering employers. In particular, more financial incentives for employers were introduced and
employers were given more responsibilities in stimulating a fast return to work. This is often
argued to be an important determinant in the recent reduction of long-term sickness absen-
teeism and the inflow into disability insurance in the Netherlands (Koning, 2004; De Jong et
al., 2011). Implementing this for self-employed workers is problematic, simply because one
cannot separate between the employer and the worker.
5
2 Institutional Setting
In the Netherlands, as in many OECD countries, self-employed workers are exempted from the
public sickness and disability insurance that is provided to employees. Therefore, they have to
buy this insurance on the private market. Slightly over 10% of the Dutch labour force consist
of self-employed workers, which is comparable to other Western European countries. Spierdijk
et al. (2009) show that long-term sickness prevalence among Dutch self-employed workers is
about 6%.2
Sickness insurance plans for self-employed workers may differ between insurance com-
panies and often insurance companies offer various plans. We analyse data from a major
Dutch private insurance company. When buying sickness insurance from this company, a self-
employed worker has to decide on a number of modalities. Two modalities are particularly
relevant for our study. The first is the deferment period, which is the time period between
falling sick and the start of benefit payment. The second relevant modality is the insured in-
come, which is at most 80% of the income of the self-employed worker. In Subsection 3.2 we
present statistics for both modalities.
Since 2003, the insurance company employs active case management in order to enhance
recovery rates. The program starts with an intake interview conducted by a caseworker. During
this interview, an initial medical diagnosis is determined. In addition, information is gathered
about the type of business of the self-employed worker and her/his existing health limitations.
Next, within the first weeks after intake of the claim, the caseworker discusses all gathered
information with a medical doctor and an occupational specialist engaged by the private insurer.
2For more background information on relevant Dutch labour market institutions, we refer
to Spierdijk et al. (2009), De Jong (2012) and Gautier and Van der Klaauw (2012).
6
Together they decide about the most appropriate intervention. The potential interventions are
classified into two tracks, which are used independently.
The first track is the medical track, in which physicians are engaged to speed up recovery.
This track takes off with the claimant visiting a medical doctor who thereafter provides a second
opinion concerning the degree of disability. Based on her/his advice, eventually supplemented
by information collected from the claimant’s general practitioner, further medical interventions
are carried out by medical doctors. The second track is the labour track, where an occupational
specialist is assigned to the claimant. The occupational specialist provides ergonomic advice
to the claimant and coaches him/her back to work.
The occupational specialists are employees of the insurance company. Their focus should
be aligned with the target of the insurance company, which is to limit total sickness payments
as much as possible. This is, however, not formalised in actual targets or incentives for the
occupational specialists. The medical doctors are not employed by the insurance company. The
contracts of the insurance company differ between the doctors working for occupational health
services and the doctors working in hospitals and general practitioners. The contracts with the
occupational health services are stricter and focus on reducing sickness absenteeism. Doctors
working in hospitals and general practitioners are generally much more focused on curing than
on stimulating re-employment. Furthermore, information exchange with these medical doctors
was less well developed and experienced often long delays.
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3 Data
3.1 Sample of Analysis
Our data are provided by a major private insurance company in the Netherlands and contain
all sickness spells between January 20, 2009 and March 31, 2014 of self-employed workers
insured against income loss due to absenteeism. The exact number of days of sickness absen-
teeism is recorded either until recovery or until March 31, 2014. For each claim, the start of
medical track and labour track interventions are recorded with a daily precision. In total, the
data include 19,488 claims.
For 19,138 claims, an initial medical diagnosis is determined during the intake interview.
From the claims with an initial medical diagnosis, we retain the 15,616 claims with a physical
condition. Excluded are 1,668 claims for maternity leave, which all have a fixed duration of
113 days, and 1,854 claims with a psychological condition. The latter claims have very differ-
ent recovery and intervention dynamics than physical claims.3 The subsample of psychological
claims (alone) is too small for an empirical analysis. Next, we drop 16 claims with negative du-
ration times, 26 claims with missing explanatory variables and 26 claims where an intervention
starts after recovery.
Our data suffer from the problem that short sickness spells may not be reported. If the self-
employed worker knows that she/he will recover before the end of the deferment period, there
is no direct incentive to report the sickness to the insurance company (even though the company
3Recovery rates are lower for claimants with a psychological condition during the first seven
months of sick leave and higher afterwards. In addition, claimants with a psychological condi-
tion have a higher probability of entering the intervention tracks during the first three months
of sick leave.
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requests to report all spells). Therefore, we set the start of our duration model for recovery to
ten days after reporting sick and drop the 136 spells with a sickness duration of less than ten
days. Short spells are often due to the flu or less serious injuries, and the insurance company
never intervenes within the first few days of sickness. Furthermore, we censor durations after
548 days (one and a half years). This avoids that we have to model outliers and less than 1%
of the medical track interventions and 5% of the labour track interventions start after 548 days.
Sensitivity checks (see Subsection 5.3) show that both choices do not substantially affect our
estimation results.
3.2 Descriptive Analysis
We observe for each claim three durations: the duration until recovery, the duration until
entering the medical track and the duration until entering the labour track. There are 6252
individuals who enter the medical track and 2888 individuals entering the labour track. In 2498
cases both tracks start during the period of sickness absenteeism. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show
the Kaplan-Meier estimates for the survival functions with respect to entering the medical and
labour track. The median duration until entering the programs is 134 days for the medical track
and 388 days for the labour track.
Figure 3 reports Kaplan-Meier estimates for the survival function until recovery (before
right censoring) by intervention. The median sick leave duration is 57 days for claimants who
do not participate in any track, it is 184 and 238 days for those who are treated exclusively
by the medical track and the labour track respectively, and more than 548 days for those who
are treated by both tracks. These differences should not be given a causal interpretation. The
composition of individuals varies between the four groups, and there is the dynamic selection
problem. As intervention tracks do not start immediately when a claimant enters sick leave,
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates for entering the medical track.
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimates for entering the labour track.
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier estimates for recovery.
participation can only be observed for claimants who are absent sufficiently long.
Our data contain an extensive set of observed claim(ant) characteristics. In Table 1 we
present summary statistics for these variables. We report these statistics both for the total
sample and for the four subsamples by undergone intervention. The majority of the individuals
are between 36 and 55 years old (at the start of the claim). The subsample of control claimants
contains both more individuals who are younger than 36 and individuals who are older than
55, while the treated claimants are overrepresented within the middle age categories. Women
have a relatively higher probability of entering the labour track intervention. There is no large
compositional difference in the region from which the subsamples of individuals come.
Concerning the occupational type and its toughness, Table 1 shows that the medical track is
used relatively more for agriculturalists, small and medium entrepreneurs and – more general –
for tough occupations while the labour track is used more among liberal and (rather) light occu-
pations. Of particular interest are the deferment period and the insured income, both captured
by four indicator variables. The shorter the deferment period and the higher the insured income
are, the more generous is the sick leave compensation. However, we do not find evidence for
systematic higher intervention rates for claimants with more generous compensations.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Subsample: All C M L ML
Age
< 36 0.187 (0.390) 0.207 (0.405) 0.176 (0.380) 0.115 (0.320) 0.143 (0.350)
36 – 45 0.332 (0.471) 0.315 (0.465) 0.344 (0.475) 0.367 (0.483) 0.370 (0.483)
46 – 55 0.357 (0.479) 0.343 (0.475) 0.357 (0.479) 0.415 (0.493) 0.398 (0.489)
> 55 0.124 (0.329) 0.134 (0.341) 0.123 (0.329) 0.103 (0.304) 0.090 (0.286)
Gender
Female 0.129 (0.335) 0.136 (0.342) 0.111 (0.314) 0.174 (0.380) 0.127 (0.332)
Region
North 0.408 (0.492) 0.402 (0.490) 0.428 (0.495) 0.415 (0.493) 0.400 (0.490)
South 0.429 (0.495) 0.427 (0.495) 0.423 (0.494) 0.405 (0.492) 0.450 (0.498)
Center 0.162 (0.369) 0.171 (0.376) 0.148 (0.356) 0.179 (0.384) 0.150 (0.357)
Occupation type
Agricultural 0.391 (0.488) 0.383 (0.486) 0.425 (0.494) 0.354 (0.479) 0.376 (0.484)
SME 0.456 (0.498) 0.440 (0.497) 0.473 (0.500) 0.410 (0.492) 0.488 (0.500)
Liberal profession 0.153 (0.360) 0.177 (0.381) 0.101 (0.302) 0.236 (0.425) 0.136 (0.343)
Toughness of occupation
(Rather) light 0.175 (0.380) 0.183 (0.387) 0.127 (0.332) 0.282 (0.451) 0.203 (0.402)
Rather tough 0.168 (0.374) 0.187 (0.390) 0.123 (0.328) 0.218 (0.413) 0.163 (0.369)
Tough 0.657 (0.475) 0.630 (0.483) 0.751 (0.433) 0.500 (0.501) 0.635 (0.482)
Insured income
< e100M 0.156 (0.363) 0.158 (0.365) 0.174 (0.379) 0.087 (0.282) 0.130 (0.336)
e100M – e500M 0.366 (0.482) 0.341 (0.474) 0.378 (0.485) 0.441 (0.497) 0.422 (0.494)
e500M – e1000M 0.277 (0.447) 0.274 (0.446) 0.278 (0.448) 0.277 (0.448) 0.285 (0.451)
> e1000M 0.202 (0.401) 0.227 (0.419) 0.170 (0.375) 0.195 (0.397) 0.163 (0.370)
Deferment period
< 14 days 0.351 (0.477) 0.349 (0.477) 0.396 (0.489) 0.244 (0.430) 0.305 (0.461)
14 days – 3 months 0.483 (0.500) 0.494 (0.500) 0.468 (0.499) 0.515 (0.500) 0.463 (0.499)
3 months – 1 year 0.107 (0.309) 0.099 (0.299) 0.088 (0.283) 0.138 (0.346) 0.157 (0.364)
> 1 year 0.059 (0.236) 0.058 (0.233) 0.049 (0.216) 0.103 (0.304) 0.075 (0.263)
Observations 15412 8870 3754 390 2498
Means and standard deviations in parentheses.
C: duration until both tracks censored.
M: duration until labour track censored; duration until medical track completed.
L: duration until medical track censored; duration until labour track completed.
ML: duration until both tracks completed.
4 Econometric Model
The goal of our econometric analysis is to estimate the causal effects of entering the medical
track and/or the labour track on recovery from sickness absenteeism. Therefore, we jointly
model the process of recovery and the entry processes into both tracks. Our model builds
on the timing-of-events framework of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003). This framework is
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ideal for studying interventions in a dynamic setting because it deals, under certain identifying
assumptions, with both selective participation and dynamic selection.
4.1 Econometric Framework
Consider a self-employed worker who first reports sick at (calender) date τ0. Our model is
a continuous-time duration model in which t describes the elapsed sickness duration and tm
and tl the durations until entering the medical and labour track, respectively. Let θr denote
the rate at which self-employed workers recover from sickness. This recovery rate can depend
on the elapsed sickness duration t, observed characteristics x, calendar time τ0 + t, unobserved
characteristics v and variables indicating whether the medical track I(tm < t) and labour track
I(tl < t) have been started (with I(·) the indicator function).
We denote the unobserved term v in the recovery rate by vr. This term is assumed to be
independent of x and τ0. Since the variables in x are mainly used as control variables and we
will not causally interpret their covariate effect, this is not a strong assumption. Conditional on
x, τ0, vr, tm and tl , the rate of recovery after t periods of sickness absenteeism follows a mixed
proportional hazard specification as described in Van den Berg (2001):
lnθr(t|x,τ0,vr, tm, tl) = λr(t)+ψr(τ0 + t)+ x′βr+δm(t|tm,x)I(tm < t)
+δl(t|tl,x)I(tl < t)+ vr. (1)
In this specification ψr(τ0 + t) is a genuine calendar-time effect modelled by dummies for each
quarter. These calendar-time effects control both for seasonal effects in recovery and for the
macroeconomic context. In addition, the function λr(t) represents the duration dependence.
The functions δm(t|tm,x) and δl(t|tl,x) are the key parameters of interest as they describe the
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causal effects of participation in the medical track and the labour track, respectively. Below,
we return to the parameterisation of the functions at the right-hand side of equation (1).
The timing of entering the medical and labour track is most likely not exogenously deter-
mined. Therefore, we jointly model the timing of entering these tracks as mixed proportional
hazard specifications:
lnθm(t|x,τ0,vm) = λm(t)+ψm(τ0 + t)+ x′βm+ vm;
lnθl(t|x,τ0,vl) = λl(t)+ψl(τ0 + t)+ x′βl + vl.
(2)
Both hazard rates describe the rate of entering the tracks given that the sick self-employed
worker has not yet entered this track. The hazard rates depend on the same set of observed
characteristics x as those determining the recovery rate.
Now consider the joint distribution of tr, tm and tl . Conditional on τ0, x, vr, vm and vl , the
only possible relation between tr and (tm, tl) goes via the direct effects of participating in the
medical track and the labour track (on the recovery rate). In case of independence between vr
and (vm,vl), we have a standard duration model for tr|x,τ0, tm, tl with I(tm < t) and I(tl < t)
time-varying regressors which are orthogonal to the unobserved heterogeneity vr. However, if
vr and (vm,vl) are not independent, inference on tr|x,τ0, tm, tl should be based on (tr, tm, tl)|x,τ0.
The identification of the treatment effect parameters hinges on two key assumptions. The
first is the no-anticipation assumption, which we discuss in the next subsection. The second as-
sumption is the mixed proportional structure of the hazard rates. This assumption is necessary
to distinguish between true duration dependence modelled via the λ -functions and dynamic
selection because the group of workers with long sickness absenteeism period has a different
composition than the group with much shorter periods. Dynamic selection is taken into account
via observed and unobserved heterogeneity. It is well known that in the absence of observed
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heterogeneity, true duration dependence cannot be distinguished from unobserved heterogene-
ity. This stresses the importance of including observed covariates x in the model even if their
parameter estimates can only be interpreted as associations. The unobserved heterogeneity
takes account of endogeneity in assigning both tracks. As will be discussed below, we find
a significantly dispersed unobserved heterogeneity distribution. However, our estimated treat-
ment parameters are quite robust to taking account of unobserved heterogeneity. The size of
the estimates and significance does not change much, which is shown in the Online Appendix.
Deriving the loglikelihood function is straightforward and this is shown in the Online Ap-
pendix. Maximum likelihood estimation requires a parameterisation of all functions in the
model. As stated above, ψr(τ0 + t) is modelled using dummies for each quarter. The parame-
terisation of the treatment parameters δm(t|tm,x) and δl(t|tl,x) is discussed in the next subsec-
tion. For the baseline hazards λr(t), λm(t) and λl(t) we use a piecewise constant specification
and the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms G(vr,vm,vl) has discrete mass
points.4 These specifications are the most flexible specifications used to date. Full details on
the parameterisation are given in the Online Appendix.
4.2 Identification of the Treatment Effects
The main parameters of interest are the effects of participating in the medical track and the
labour track on recovery from sickness absenteeism. There are two complications in their
empirical evaluation. First, there may be selection on (un)observable claim(ant) characteristics
when assigning sick workers to both tracks. Second, since participation in the tracks does not
4The cut-off points in the piecewise constant specification are t0 = 0, t1 = 10, t2 = 20,
t3 = 40, t4 = 70, t5 = 100, t6 = 140, t7 = 190 and t8 = +∞ (days). For the discrete-mass point
specification we use four unrestricted mass points. The robustness of this restriction is studied
in Subsection 5.3.
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start at the beginning of sick leave but during the spell, those with a long sickness spell are
more likely to enter the tracks. The second complication is solved by the dynamic structure of
the model, which explicitly accounts for the length of sickness spells. The first complication
deals with the essential identification problem in dynamic settings.
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) provide an extensive discussion on the identification of
dynamic treat effects in duration models. The key assumption for assigning a causal interpreta-
tion to the effects δm(t|tm,x) and δl(t|tl,x) of participation in the medical and labour track is that
the moment of starting the tracks is not anticipated. No anticipation implies that conditional on
both observed and unobserved characteristics, the recovery rate at each moment of time does
not depend on the exact timing of track participation in the future. This does not imply that
participating in the tracks is exogenous. Based on both observed and unobserved characteris-
tics sick workers may have different intervention rates, and these intervention rates may change
during the spell of sickness absenteeism. The timing-of-events framework explicitly allows for
selection on unobservables.
In the Online Appendix we provide figures showing the distribution of elapsed sickness
duration at which individuals enter both tracks. These figures show a lot of dispersion even
if we stratify workers by their deferment period and insured income. The figures suggest that
it is difficult for individuals to predict beforehand when they enter the tracks, which can be
interpreted as evidence in favour of the no anticipation assumption.
In our institutional setting, the insurer aims at minimising the waiting times before entering
treatment. Not only because the insurer wants to act quickly, but also because she/he wants to
avoid uncertainty for self-employed workers. In practice, this implies that once the caseworker
decides that a given track is useful for the worker, the worker enters this track as soon as
possible. The waiting times between the caseworker announcing entering a track and the start
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of the track are, therefore, more in terms of days than in terms of weeks. Actually, the contracts
with the medical doctors contain incentives for limiting waiting times. This implies that the
anticipation period is short and likely unimportant.
If the assumption of no anticipation is satisfied, no exclusions restrictions are necessary to
identify the causal intervention effects.5 However, Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) show that
the mixed proportional hazard rate specifications are required. We are concerned that the pro-
portionality assumption (i.e. observed and unobserved determinants affect the transition rates
to recovery, the medical track and the labour track proportionally) may not be satisfied across
individuals with different deferment periods and that this may be a source of bias. One might
argue that those with long deferment periods will not start a claim in case of light diseases.
As a result, those with a long deferment period may have longer sickness durations ceteris
paribus, and are, therefore, a negatively selected subsample of the population of self-employed
workers with a high deferment period. This can cause non-proportionality with respect to the
unobserved determinants of recovery: one might expect vr to be lower for those with a long
deferment period. For that reason, in Subsection 5.3, we present a sensitivity analysis in which
we estimate our model separately for two subsamples stratified by deferment period.
In case the mixed proportional hazard assumption is satisfied, the causal effects of partici-
pating in the intervention tracks can depend on the elapsed duration of the sickness spell t, the
moment of entering the tracks tm and tl , and observed characteristics x.6 As a benchmark spec-
ification, we choose homogenous and constant effects: δm(t|tm,x) = δm,0 and δl(t|tl,x) = δl,0.
We refer to this model as the constant effects model.
5Throughout the remainder of this article, “treatment effect” and “intervention effect” are
used interchangeable.
6Richardson and Van den Berg (2013) show that causal effects are even allowed to depend
on unobserved characteristics v.
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In a second specification, we allow the effects of both tracks to depend on the elapsed
sickness duration at the start of participation in the track. Thereby, we are able to distinguish
between the impact of early, middle late and late interventions. Early interventions start in
the first six weeks of the claim, middle late interventions in week 7 until week 13 and late
interventions (i.e. the reference category) after 13 weeks. We refer to this specification as the
duration varying effects model:
δm(t|tm,x) = δm,0 +δm,tm≤42I(tm ≤ 42)+δm,43≤tm≤91I(43≤ tm ≤ 91);
δl(t|tl,x) = δl,0 +δl,tl≤42I(tl ≤ 42)+δl,43≤tl≤91I(43≤ tl ≤ 91).
(3)
Finally, in Subsection 5.2 we also present some analyses where we allow for (other types of)
heterogeneous treatment effects. The heterogenous effects model is specified, in its application
for heterogeneity by gender, as follows:
δm(t|tm,x) = δm,0 +δm,femaleI(female);
δl(t|tl,x) = δl,0 +δl,femaleI(female).
(4)
5 Results
In this section we first present and discuss the estimation results for our benchmark model
in which we estimate homogenous and constant effects of participating in the medical and
labour track. Next, we look into heterogeneity in the treatment effects by the timing of the
interventions and by claim(ant) characteristics. In a third subsection, we discuss robustness
tests for our main results. We end this section with a discussion of our findings. In the main
text, we present the estimated treatment effects. Detailed estimation results can be found in the
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Online Appendix.
5.1 Constant Effects Model
Table 2 presents the estimates for the key parameters of interest for the constant effects model.
The estimated treatment effects are highly significantly negative for both interventions, with
a comparable magnitude. Recovery rates drop by about 37.1% (i.e. 1− exp(−0.464)) when
starting the medical track and by about 38.5% when starting the labour track. From the mo-
ment both tracks are started, the recovery rate drops by about 61.3%. So, the homogeneous
effects model does not show any benefits of offering the interventions on recovery rates of
self-employed workers. In Subsection 5.4 we discuss the interpretation of these results and we
provide an explanation for the negative finding.
Table 2: Estimated Intervention Effects in the Constant Effects Model.
Medical track
δm,0 −0.464∗∗∗ (0.051)
Labour track
δl,0 −0.486∗∗∗ (0.054)
Duration dependence yes
Calendar time effects yes
Observed heterogeneity yes
Unobserved heterogeneity yes
N 15412
Parameters 146
Loglikelihood -133124.921
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1% level.
Detailed estimation results are in the Online Appendix.
Before inspecting heterogeneity within and robustness of the estimated intervention effects,
we briefly highlight some secondary results based on the other estimated parameters (outlined
in the Online Appendix). The intervention tracks are used more for expensive claims: low
deferment periods and high insured incomes predict earlier entry in the intervention tracks. A
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lower deferment period and a higher insured income also result in higher recovery rates. On
the one hand, this finding is in line with our estimated intervention effects, as both point in
the direction of no moral hazard. On the other hand, this finding supports the idea that due to
underreporting of short sickness spells the individuals with a high deferment period observed
in our data are a negatively selected subsample of the population of sick self-employed workers
with high deferment periods (see Subsection 4.2). We come back to this issue in Subsection 5.3.
Finally, the recovery rate is higher for younger claimants and claimants with tough occupations.
The calendar time effects show that the use of the medical track decreased over our obser-
vation period. This coincides with information from the private insurance provider about its
policy. Next, although non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates (see Figures 1 to 3) indicate
negative duration dependence of the modelled hazard rates, after controlling for observable
and unobservable claim(ant) characteristics and quarter dummies, we observe positive duration
dependence in all hazard rates. The longer the sickness duration, the more likely it is that a
self-employed worker will recover (or get treated), which makes sense. The increase in recov-
ery probability is most substantial during the first 30 days, and is likely related to reporting
behaviour. The first sickness day is the day that the self-employed worker consults a physician,
but the worker only has the obligation to inform the insurer somewhere during the deferment
period. So if the self-employed expects to recover quickly, she/he can wait with reporting to the
insurer. Short sickness spells are, therefore, especially for those with a substantial deferment
period, likely not always reported in our data. On the other hand, the number of individuals
entering the tracks is low early in the sickness spell. The caseworker may start the intervention
tracks when recovery takes longer than expected.
Concerning the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, we observe that there is a group
which recovers quickly and never enters any track. In addition, we observe that those in-
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dividuals with unobserved characteristics associated to the lowest recovery rates (the second
heterogeneity type) are also not likely to enter the intervention tracks. There is thus strong
selectivity in the assignment of tracks.
5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Table 3 presents the intervention effects for the duration varying effects model. The estimates
for the other parameters of this model, which are very comparable to those outlined in the
Online Appendix for the constant effects model, are available on request.
Table 3: Estimated Intervention Effects in the Duration Varying Effects Model.
Medical track
δm,0 −0.468∗∗∗ (0.054)
δm,tm≤42 −0.010 (0.052)
δm,43≤tm≤91 −0.011 (0.040)
Labour track
δl,0 −0.468∗∗∗ (0.057)
δl,tl≤42 −0.015 (0.114)
δl,43≤tl≤91 −0.154∗ (0.080)
Duration dependence yes
Calendar time effects yes
Observed heterogeneity yes
Unobserved heterogeneity yes
N 15412
Parameters 150
Loglikelihood -133122.752
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗(∗) indicates significance at 1%(10%) level.
The adverse effects of both interventions are present for early, middle late and late interven-
tions. In particular, for the medical track, there is no significant heterogeneity in the interven-
tion effect by its timing. There is, however, some weak evidence for a more adverse effect of
the labour track when this track starts more than 13 weeks after the start of the sickness spell.
The labour track intervention decreases recovery rates by about 37.4% (i.e. 1− exp(−0.468))
if the intervention is started early in the spell of sickness absenteeism (within six weeks) and
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by about 46.3% (i.e. 1− exp(−0.468−0.154)) if this intervention is started late (later than 13
weeks after the start of the spell).
Table 4: Estimated Intervention Effects in the Heterogeneous Effects Model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medical track
δm,0 −0.458∗∗∗ (0.052) −0.376∗∗∗ (0.061) −0.437∗∗∗ (0.057) −0.337∗∗∗ (0.053)
δm, f emalegender 0.058 (0.067)
δm,toughoccupation −0.118∗∗ (0.049)
δm,ins. inc. > e500K −0.044 (0.045)
δm,def. per. < 14 days −0.231∗∗∗ (0.050)
Labour track
δl,0 −0.469∗∗∗ (0.056) −0.383∗∗ (0.070) −0.507∗∗∗ (0.068) −0.213∗∗∗ (0.090)
δl, f emalegender −0.038 (0.098)
δl,toughoccupation −0.173∗∗ (0.069)
δl,ins. inc. > e500K 0.045 (0.068)
δl,def. per. < 14 days −0.068 (0.076)
Duration dependence yes yes yes yes
Calendar time effects yes yes yes yes
Observed heterogeneity yes yes yes yes
Unobserved heterogeneity yes yes yes yes
N 15412 15412 15412 15412
Parameters 148 148 148 148
Loglikelihood -133124.042 -133115.726 -133124.324 -133100.236
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗(∗∗) indicates significance at 1%(5%) level.
Next, we explore other dimensions of heterogeneity in the intervention effects. Table 4
presents the intervention effects for the related heterogeneous effects models. The adverse ef-
fects of both interventions are present for all subsamples by gender (column (1)), toughness of
the occupation (column (2)), insured income (column (3)) and deferment period (column (4)).
We find only evidence for two aspects of heterogeneity in the intervention effects. First, both
tracks are more adverse for claimants with tough occupations. Tough occupations may result
in frequent (and minor) physical claims for which interventions are not effective. Second, the
medical track is more adverse in case of smaller deferment periods. This finding is comple-
mentary to the idea that the observed individuals with a long deferment period are a negatively
selected subsample of the population of self-employed workers with a long deferment period.
For these individuals, medical treatment might be less adverse. We discuss this further in the
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next subsection.
5.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present additional analyses to test the robustness of our main results. In
Subsection 4.2, we mentioned that the mixed proportional hazard assumption may fail across
claimants with different deferment periods. Therefore, we re-estimate our benchmark model
separately for two subsamples defined according to their deferment period. Table 5 indicates
that the estimates of the intervention effects are somewhat larger (i.e more negative) for those
with a short deferment period (shorter than 14 days) compared with those with a more sub-
stantial deferment period. Thereby, this analysis confirms the idea of a more adverse effect
of the medical track for claimants with a short deferment period as mentioned in the previous
subsection.7
Table 5: Estimated Intervention Effects in the Constant Effects Model, Subsamples by Defer-
ment Period.
Deferment period Deferment period
< 14 days ≥ 14 days
Medical track
δm,0 −0.525∗∗∗ (0.087) −0.328∗∗∗ (0.057)
Labour track
δl,0 −0.609∗∗∗ (0.089) −0.154∗ (0.089)
Duration dependence yes yes
Calendar time effects yes yes
Observed heterogeneity yes yes
Unobserved heterogeneity yes yes
N 5408 10004
Parameters 137 143
Loglikelihood -45870.735 -87066.575
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗(∗) indicates significance at 1%(10%) level.
Next, as mentioned in the section elaborating on the parameterisation of our model (in the
7Other subsamples by deferment period turned out to be too small to obtain robust estimates
for our econometric model.
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Online Appendix), throughout our benchmark analyses, we followed the literature by fixing
the number of heterogeneity types K to 4. However, to test the sensibility of our results with
respect to this strategy, we re-estimate all models presented in the previous two subsections
following an alternative strategy. More concretely, we re-estimate these models following a
gradual approach in which we add points of support until the likelihood function does not
show any improvement and subsequently select the number of mass-points K that minimises
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). When doing that, K = 7 turns out to be the optimal
number of unobserved heterogeneity types for all models. The estimates when following this
strategy are available on request. They yield conclusions identical to those discussed in the
previous two subsections with one exception: the treatment effect of the medical track is no
longer heterogeneous by the toughness of the occupation.
In further robustness checks, announced in Subsection 3.1, we re-estimated the constant ef-
fects model (i) without setting the starting time of the modelled durations to ten days after their
start in the source data and (ii) without censoring the duration times after 548 days. In addition,
as mentioned in the parameterisation of our model (in the Online Appendix) and to anticipate
the critique that selection on unobservables might not be well identified as a consequence of
overfitting, we estimated our benchmark model for four intervals in the baseline hazard func-
tion instead of eight. We also tested the robustness of our results after increasing the number of
intervals to 13. However, these operations influenced the findings only negligibly.
5.4 Discussion of the Main Results
The estimated parameters of the interventions show robust evidence for adverse effects of in-
terventions by medical doctors and occupational specialists with respect to reducing sick leave
durations of self-employed workers. Parameter estimates in duration models are not always
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easy to interpret. Therefore, we quantify the size of the treatment effects using simulations
based on the estimated constant effects model.8 The results of the simulations are presented
in Table 6. We consider exit from sickness within 30 days and within 180 days. For the first
case we study the effects of interventions after 15 days on sickness and for the second case we
study the effects of interventions after 30 days. In both cases we show both the treatment ef-
fects within the full population (“average treatment effect”; henceforth ATE) and on the treated
(“average treatment effect on the treated”; henceforth ATET). The effects on the treated are
slightly more negative indicating that interventions are targeted to individuals who suffer most
from them. In line with the results discussed in the previous subsections, we find that the labour
track has slightly larger adverse effects than the medical track, and that combining both tracks
reduces exit rates by almost 50% after 30 days and 40% after 180 days.
Table 6: Simulated Intervention Effects Based on the Constant Effects Model.
Exit rate Effect medical track Effect labour track Effect both tracks
A. Intervention after 15 days
Exit within 30 days: ATE 0.326 -0.087 -0.091 -0.153
Exit within 30 days: ATET 0.324 -0.092 -0.096 -0.160
B. Intervention after 30 days
Exit within 180 days: ATE 0.694 -0.128 -0.134 -0.249
Exit within 180 days: ATET 0.728 -0.148 -0.155 -0.282
This paper is not the only one which finds an adverse effect of interventions on sickness du-
ration; as mentioned in the introduction, also Engstro¨m et al. (2017) find a similar adverse effect
for early interventions in Sweden. In what follows, we provide some potential explanations for
this pattern. A first potential explanation for our overall finding of negative treatment effects is
that moral hazard in sickness insurance is probably low among self-employed workers. Given
their personal and inherent job characteristics self-employed workers have a strong interest in
keeping their absence durations as short as possible, even shorter than optimal from a health
8Our specification of the model allows for the computation of expectations without simula-
tions. For ease of presentation we refer to these expectations as simulated effects.
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point of view. Our secondary results with respect to the effect of benefit generosity (captured
by insured income and deferment period) on recovery rates seem to confirm this hypothesis.
A second possible explanation is that medical doctors may not be effective in reducing
moral hazard. This explanation is in agreement with Carlsen and Nyborg (2009), who show
that due to information asymmetries, medical doctors might be unable to distinguish shirkers
from certain groups of truly sick.
Furthermore, a principal-agent problem may exists between the insurance company and the
medical doctors and occupational specialists. The insurance company does not provide any
(financial) incentives to speed up recovery and the engaged medical doctors and occupational
specialists may apply all measures for the benefit of the sick avoiding health risks on the pa-
tient’s behalf. It is not unlikely that they advise even longer sick leave periods than necessary
(Hartman et al., 2013). This might a fortiori be the case for the medical doctors as, notwith-
standing their gatekeeping role, these physicians work under the Hippocratic Oath. That the
medical doctors are not very much focused on stimulating re-employment can be confirmed by
the often long delays in information exchange with the insurance company. In addition, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that occupational specialists tend to focus on patients’ limitations and
stress these by using interventions rather than to focus on the possibilities for (partial) return to
work.
This focus on the well-being of the claimants brings us to a next possible explanation.
While self-employed workers may aim to return to the work floor as soon as possible (taking
into account only the short-term perspective), the medical doctors and occupational specialists
may also take into account the long-term perspective (avoiding relapses). Thereby, participation
in one of the tracks can slow self-employed workers down in their ambition to return to work
and convince them about a more realistic trajectory. Unfortunately, we are not able to take this
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long-term perspective into account based on our data.
Finally, the other way round, it may be that the engaged medical doctors and occupational
specialists simply maximise their profits by keeping the patients home for a longer period
(yielding more paid visits).
6 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the effectiveness of medical doctors (offering medical support)
and occupational specialists (offering ergonomic advice and coaching) in reducing sick leave
durations among self-employed workers. While the effectiveness of medical practitioners in
reducing sick leave occurrence and sick leave duration has been studied by several researchers
for (publicly insured) employees, this has not yet been investigated for (privately insured) self-
employed workers. We exploit unique administrative data from a major Dutch private insurance
company. From these data we use all sickness benefit applications with a physical condition
by self-employed workers between January 2009 and March 2014. We estimate a multivariate
duration model dealing with the non-random and dynamic selection into the intervention tracks
engaging medical doctors (“medical track”) and occupational specialists (“labour track”) by
controlling on observable and unobservable intervention determinants.
We find adverse treatment effects for both the medical and labour track interventions, which
are robust against various sensitivity checks. Moreover, these treatment effects are very sim-
ilar in magnitude for both interventions. After starting a track, recovery rates drop by about
37.1% (medical track) or 38.5% (labour track). The negative effects of both interventions are
present for early, middle late and late interventions. In addition, they are present for all tested
subsamples by gender, toughness of the occupation, insured income and deferment period.
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We cannot determine what is the key mechanism causing the adverse effects of the interven-
tions, but we provide several potential explanations. First, moral hazard in sickness insurance
can be low among self-employed workers given their personal and job characteristics. The
finding that claimants with more generous sickness benefits (due to a lower deferment period
and/or a higher insured income) do not recover faster is consistent with this hypothesis. In
addition, the engaged medical doctors and occupational specialists may be ineffective in re-
ducing sick leave durations as they (i) might be unable to distinguish shirkers from truly sick,
(ii) might give priority to healing over gatekeeping or (iii) might just maximise their number of
visits. Lastly, medical doctors and occupational specialists may be more focussed on long-term
health than the self-employed workers, who may be more interested in restarting work as soon
as possible. To what extent the adverse short-term effect of their interventions are compensated
by potentially beneficial long-term effects with respect to the productivity of the self-employed
workers, seems a fruitful direction for future research. If these long-term effects turn out not
to compensate the short-term treatment effects presented in this article, investing in similar
interventions for reducing sick leave of self-employed workers seems not to be rational.
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